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Abstract
Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) offer an unprecedented opportunity to run economic game
experiments quickly and inexpensively. Using Mturk, we recruited 756 subjects and examined their behavior in four
canonical economic games, with two payoff conditions each: a stakes condition, in which subjects’ earnings were based on
the outcome of the game (maximum earnings of $1); and a no-stakes condition, in which subjects’ earnings are unaffected
by the outcome of the game. Our results demonstrate that economic game experiments run on MTurk are comparable to
those run in laboratory settings, even when using very low stakes.
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Introduction
Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) are internet marketplaces in which people can complete
short tasks (typically 5 minutes or less) in exchange for small
amounts of money (typically $1 or less). MTurk is becoming
increasingly popular as a platform for conducting experiments
across the social sciences [1–7]. In particular, MTurk offers an
unprecedented opportunity to run incentivized economic game
experiments quickly and inexpensively. Recent work has replicat-
ed classical findings such as framing and priming on MTurk [8–
10], found a high level of test-retest reliability on Mturk [10–12],
and shown quantitative agreement in behavior between MTurk
and the physical laboratory [6,8]. Yet concerns remain regarding
the low stakes typically used in MTurk experiments.
In this study, we directly examine the effect of such stakes by
comparing un-incentivized play with play involving typical MTurk
sized stakes (up to $1) in four canonical economic games - the
dictator game, ultimatum game, trust game and public goods
game. Our results are consistent with previous research conducted
in the physical laboratory using an order of magnitude higher
stakes.
Prior work on the dictator game found that subjects became
significantly less generous when going from no stakes to low stakes
[13], but that going from low stakes to high stakes did not affect
donations [13,14]. Consistent with these results, we find that the
average donation on MTurk decreases from 44% with no stakes to
33% with $1 stakes.
Prior work on the ultimatum game has found that adding stakes
does not affect the average proposal but may increase the variance
in proposals [13,15], while the results for responder behavior are
more mixed, with one study finding no effect [13] and another
finding a significant decrease in rejection rates [15]. It has also
been found that increasing from low to high stakes has little effect
on either proposals or rejection rates, unless the stakes are
extremely large [13–17]. Our results when comparing no stakes
with $1 stakes on MTurk are broadly consistent with these
previous findings. In particular, we see no difference in Player 1
proposals, or the minimal amount accepted by Player 2 s when
excluding ‘inconsistent’ players (people who accepted some offer X
while also rejecting one or more offers greater than X). However
we do find that adding stakes decreases the fraction of such
inconsistent Player 2 s, and decreases rejection rates of some
Player 1 offers when including inconsistent Player 2 s.
There has been less study of the role of stakes in other social
dilemma games. To our knowledge, comparisons between no
stakes and low stakes have not been performed in the public goods
game or the trust game. Considering the increase of stake size,
Kocher, Martinsson and Visser [18] found no significant
difference in subjects’ contributions in the public goods game
when going from low to high stakes, and Johansson-Stenman,
Mahmud and Martinsson [19] found that in the trust game, the
amount sent by investors decreased when using very high stakes
but the fraction returned by trustees was not affected by the
changes in stakes. We find no difference in cooperation in the
public goods game or trust or trustworthiness in the trust game
when comparing no stakes with $1 stakes on MTurk.
Materials and Methods
This research was approved by the committee on the use of
human subjects in research of Harvard University, application
number F17468-103. Informed consent was obtained from all
subjects.
We recruited 756 subjects using MTurk and randomly assigned
each subject to play one of four canonical games - the dictator
game, ultimatum game, trust game and public goods game - either
with or without stakes. In all eight conditions, subjects received a
$0.40 show up fee. In the four stakes conditions, subjects had the
opportunity to earn up to an additional $1.00 based on their score
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K  in the game (at an exchange rate of 1 point=1 cent). In the four
no-stakes conditions, subjects were informed of the outcome of the
game, but the score in the game did not affect subjects’ earnings.
In all conditions, subjects had to complete a series of comprehen-
sion questions about the rules of the game and their compensation,
and only subjects that answered all questions correctly were
allowed to participate. We now explain the implementation details
of each of the four games.
In the Dictator game (DG), Player 1 (the dictator) chose an
amount x (xv~100) to transfer to Player 2, resulting in Player 1
receiving a score of 100{x and Player 2 receiving a score of x.
In the Ultimatum Game (UG), Player 1 (the proposer) chose an
amount x (x[½0,10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90,100 ) to offer to
Player 2 (the responder). Player 2 could then accept, resulting in
Player 1 receiving a score of 100{x and Player 2 receiving a score
of x; or reject, resulting in both players receiving a score of 0. We
used the strategy method to elicit Player 2 decisions (i.e., Player 2
indicated whether she would accept or reject each possible Player
1 offer). For each Player 2 we then calculated her Minimum
Acceptable Offer (MAO) as the smallest offer she was willing to
accept. As in the physical lab, some subjects were ‘inconsistent’ in
that they were willing to accept some of the lower offers, but
rejected higher offers (that is, they did not have a threshold for
acceptance) [20]. When calculating MAOs, we did not include
such inconsistent players. We also examined how the addition of
stakes changed the fraction of inconsistent players, as well as the
rejection rates for each possible Player 1 offer when including all
Player 2 s (consistent and inconsistent).
In the Trust Game (TG), Player 1 (the investor) chose an
amount x (xv~40) to transfer to Player 2 (the trustee). The
transferred amount was multiplied by 3 and given to the trustee,
who then chose a fraction y (where yv~1) to return to Player 1.
As a result, Player 1 received a score of (40{x)z3yx and Player
2 received a score of 3x(1{y). We used the strategy method to
elicit Player 2 decisions (i.e., Player 2 indicated the fraction she
would return for each possible Player 1 transfer).
In the Public Goods Game (PGG), four players each received an
initial endowment of 40 units, and simultaneously choose an
amount x (xiv~40) to contribute to a public pool. The total
amount in the pot was multiplied by 2 and then divided equally
by all group members. As a result, player i received the score
(40{xi)z2
P4
j~1 xj
4
.
In the DG, UG and TG experiments, each subject played both
roles, first making a decision as Player 1, and then making a
decision as Player 2. Subjects were not informed that they would
subsequently play as Player 2 when making their Player 1
decisions. Unless otherwise noted, all statistical tests use the
Wilcoxon Rank-sum test.
Results and Discussion
As can be seen in Figure 1, introducing stakes altered the
distribution of offers in the DG, significantly reducing the average
offer (no-stakes=43.8%, stakes=33.2%, p~0:022). In the UG, we
found a marginally significant positive effect of stakes on Player 1
proposals (no-stakes=46.1%, stakes=49.7%, p~0:097). Given the
small effect size and borderline significant p-value, we conclude that
stakes have little effect on P1 offers in the UG. We also find no
significant effect on Player 2 MAOs in the UG (excluding
inconsistent players) (p~0:285). However, we do find a significantly
higher proportion of inconsistent Player 29s in the no-stakes
condition compared to the stakes condition (Chi2 test, p~0:015).
As a result, we also find a significant effect of stakes on Player 2
rejection rates for some Player 1 offers in the UG when including
inconsistent players (p~0:037 for the 30% offer, and pv0:004 for
Figure 1. The effect of stakes on average behavior across games.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031461.g001
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transfers in the TG (p~0:386), back-transfers in the TG (pw0:40
for all possible Player 1 transfers), and contributions in the PGG
(p~0:656). We also test whether the variance in behavior differs
between the stakes and no-stakes conditions using Levene’s F-test.
Consistent with our results above, we find that the variance in DG
donationsissignificantlysmallerinthestakesconditioncomparedto
the no-stakes condition (p~0:008), but that adding stakes did not
have an effect on the variance of offers (p~0:889) and MAOs in the
UG (p~0:678), transfers (p~0:113) and back-transfers in the TG
(pw0:600 for back-transfers on all Player 1 transfers, except for the
transfer of 25% where the variance of Player 2 back-transfers in the
stakes condition was marginally higher, p~0:098), and contribu-
tions in the PGG (p~0:517).
Furthermore, we find that the average behavior on MTurk is in
line with behavior observed previously in the physical laboratory
with higher stakes. The average donation of 33.2% in our $1 stakes
DG is close to the average donation of 28.4% aggregated over
more than 616 DG treatments as reviewed in a recent meta-
analysis [21].
Since there was little difference in behavior between the stakes
and no-stakes conditions in the UG, TG and PGG, we compare
the aggregated averages from both conditions in these games to
prior work. Considering the UG, it has been shown that using the
strategy method significantly affects behavior [22], and to our
knowledge no meta-analyses exist which focus on strategy-method
UGs. Therefore, we examine behavior in various previous UG
experiments that used the strategy method [23–29], and compare
the range of outcomes to what we observe in our data. The
average Player 1 offer of 48.1% in our experiment is within the
range of behavior observed in those studies (35.4%–48.4%), as is
our average Player 2 MAO of 33.7% (compared to the range of
previous MAOs of 19.2%–36.0%).
Turning now to the TG, we find that the average percentage
sent by Player 1 in our experiment (56.6%) is quite close to the
average value of 50.9% reported in a recent trust game meta-
analysis aggregating over approximately 80 experiments [30]. The
fraction returned by Player 2 of 40.1% in our experiment is also
close to the average returned fraction of 36.5% from the same
meta-analysis.
For the public goods game, it is important to compare our
results to those obtained in previous experiments using the same
Marginal Per-Capita Return value (MPCR=0.5 in our study). In
the absence of a meta-analysis that breaks contributions down by
MPCR, we compare the average contribution level in our
experiment to the range of average contributions observed in
various previous studies using the same MPCR [31–36]. The
average fraction of the endowment contributed to the public good
in our study of 67.7% is within the range observed in these studies
(40%–70.4%).
To conclude, we have assessed the effect of $1 stakes compared
to no stakes in economic games run in the online labor market
Amazon Mechanical Turk. The results are generally consistent
with what is observed in the physical laboratory, both in terms of
the effect of adding stakes, and the average behavior in the stakes
conditions. These experiments help alleviate concerns about the
validity of economic game experiments conducted on MTurk and
demonstrate the applicability of this framework for conducting
large scale scientific studies.
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